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Defining "Primary Defendants" in the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005
Words are clumsy tools, and it is very easy to cut one's
fingers with them, and they need the closest attention in
handling,- but they are the only tools we have, and
imagination itself cannot work without them. You must
master the use of them, or you will wander forever guessing
at the mercy of mere impulse and unrecognized
assumptions and arbitrary associations, carried away with
every wind of doctrine. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2005, President Bush signed into law the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") after congressional
efforts spanning over seven years.2 One focus of CAFA was the
expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction.3 The purpose of this
jurisdictional modification was to remedy the influx of complex
class action suits in state courts, as well as to regulate plaintiffs'
attempts to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction by naming "token
defendants." 4 Generally, CAFA provides for federal jurisdiction
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Felix Frankfurter, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES
29 (photo. reprint 1975) (1947) (citing J.W. Allen, Essay on Jeremy Bentham, in
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 181, 199 (1950)).
2. Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, Mapping the New Class Action
Frontier: A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and Amended Federal Rule
23, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 11 (2005).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2005). The Act also makes significant
changes with respect to the regulation of settlements in class action suits. These
settlement regulations are meant to protect plaintiffs from a recent trend in
which class members' attorneys receive higher settlement fees than the
individual class members. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14-20 (2005), reprinted in
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15-20 (It is important to note that the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report on CAFA was not issued until ten days after the legislation
was passed; therefore, some courts find it of little value as an interpretive aid.).
4. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 9 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
11. See also Andree Sophia Blumstein, A New Road to Resolution: The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41-APR TENN. B.J. 16, 19 (2005).
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when there is minimal diversity5 and the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million.6  This provision states the general rule that
class actions falling within the scope of CAFA are to be litigated in
federal court.
7
Because CAFA requires plaintiffs to bring nearly all class
action claims in federal court, there was a concern that the Act
might interfere with the states' interest in adjudicating truly local
disputes.8 In order to combat this concern, Congress integrated a
series of exceptions into CAFA that provide for adjudication of
class action suits in state court.9 These exceptions include the
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C) (2005) (minimal diversity exists when at
least one member of the plaintiff class is diverse from any defendant).
6. The relevant language may be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d):
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is a class action in which-
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a
citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a
citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state.
(6) In any class action, the claims of the individual class
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.
In pre-CAFA class actions, there was much debate as to whether each
plaintiff had to individually satisfy the amount in controversy. CAFA
eliminates this confusion and allows the plaintiff class to aggregate its
claims.
7. CAFA does not apply when the aggregate number of class members is
less than one hundred, when the issue involves federal securities laws, or when
there is a relation to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation arising
under the law of the state where the corporation is incorporated. Rollo &
Crowson, supra note 2, at 14.
8. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 28 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28.
9. Id.
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"Home State" exception, the "Local Controversy" exception, and
the "State Action Case" exception.'
0
The problem with these exceptions is that they are ill-defined."
They provide state court jurisdiction when the primary defendants
and the majority of the plaintiff class are citizens of the state in
which the action was filed or when one real defendant from whom
the class seeks significant relief is local. 12 The statute is unclear
about which defendants classify as "primary" or "significant," thus
making it difficult to determine when the exceptions apply.
This comment analyzes several ways in which the ambiguous
term "primary defendant," as used in the "Home State" exception
and the "State Action Case" exception, should be defined. It also
illustrates the importance of distinguishing "primary defendants"
from "significant defendants." The comment is organized as
follows. Part II includes background information on CAFA. It
addresses the history and purpose of the exceptions allowing
certain class action suits to remain in state court. Part II also
examines one of the first cases to address the meaning of "primary
defendant" and introduces the importance of distinguishing
between "primary" and "significant" defendants. The section
concludes with a summary of the problems posed by the federal
jurisdiction exceptions. Part III analyzes the term "primary
defendant" through the use of traditional statutory interpretation
techniques. It examines the face of the text, the legislative intent
of the term, and the use of "primary defendant" in other areas of
the law. This section also analogizes CAFA to the Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act ("MMTJA"), which utilizes the
term "primary defendant" in a similar minimal diversity provision.
Part IV proposes a series of possible definitions for "primary
defendant" as derived from other areas of the law. Part V
concludes with the proposal that classifying the "primary
defendants" as those who are directly liable to the plaintiff class is
the most effective definition. Defining the "primary defendants" in
such a manner is consistent with both the plain meaning of the text
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2005). See also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 28
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28.
11. Rollo & Crowson, supra note 2, at 12.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4) (2005).
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and the legislative intent. It is also the most workable definition
from a public policy perspective.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to better understand CAFA, it is important to consider
the pre-CAFA jurisdictional problems faced by courts litigating
class actions. It then becomes clearer why Congress believed there
was a need for the Act. Because of the length and complexity of
CAFA, this comment will only focus on several important
provisions in CAFA. In analyzing these focal provisions, this
comment will explain each provision and illustrate, through the use
of Adams v. Federal Materials Co., Inc.,13 the problems that arise
in their application.
A. Pre-CAFA Jurisdictional Problems
Congress's enactment of CAFA was a reaction to the
inequitable practices of the parties involved in class action
litigation. Defendants fought to remove cases to federal court
where it was more likely they could defeat class certification and
protect their clients' interests.' 4 Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
fought to keep class actions in state court because it was a more
favorable forum. They not only had a better chance of getting
class certification, but they also had a better chance of receiving
larger damages from sympathetic juries. 15
13. No. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005). At the
time this comment was written, this was one of only a few cases that addressed
CAFA and how the term "primary defendant" should be interpreted under the
Act. Though the Adams case is not directly on point with this issue, its fact
pattern is used as a means of illustrating the problems with the ambiguity in the
term "primary defendant." The following cases have since published opinions
addressing the term "primary defendant": Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., No. 06-
1363, 2006 WL 2348888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2006); Hangarter v. The Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., No. 05-04558, 2006 WL 213834 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006);
and Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-5644, 2005 WL 3967998 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
21, 2005).
14. Georgene M. Vairo, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESs ACT OF 2005: WiTH
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 2 (2005).
15. Id. at 2-3.
906 [Vol. 67
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As part of their forum shopping scheme, plaintiffs also filed
"copy cat" class action suits in multiple jurisdictions.16 As a result,
corporate defendants were forced to settle frivolous suits in order
to avoid lengthy and expensive litigation in several .different
states.' 7  These multiple suits resulted in greater expenses and
wasted resources. Federal courts have the ability to remedy this
problem by consolidating same or similar suits filed in multiple
jurisdictions.' 8
Plaintiffs' and defendants' competing interests led to
Congress's amendment of class action procedures.19 Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins20 stands for the proposition that the result of a
case should not be different simply because it was brought in state
rather than federal court.2 1 CAFA expands federal jurisdiction in
an attempt to prevent forum shopping and to stop plaintiffs from
"gaming the system" in order to keep their case in state court.2 2
Though forum shopping and plaintiffs' attempts to "game the
system" were the primary reasons for amending 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d), the Congressional Record reflects several other reasons
for the enactment of CAFA's procedural changes.
Congress believed that federal judges would more carefully
apply the complex procedural requirements that govern class
actions. 23 Allegedly, state courts failed to carefully apply class
certification requirements and gave counsel leverage to obtain
unwarranted settlements. 24 Congress believed federal judges were
more apt to scrutinize class action allegations and to deny
certification where a state judge may improperly grant it.25
16. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal
Case out of It. . In State Court, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 152 (2001).
17. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 20-21 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
21.
18. Beisner & Miller, supra note 16, at 152.
19. Vairo, supra note 14, at 2-4.
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating
the policy underlying Erie, which held that there is no federal general common
law).
22. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11.
23. Id. at 14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14.
24. Beisner & Miller, supra note 16, at 154.
25. Id.
2007]
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Congress also believed that federal courts could help alleviate
the strain on state court resources resulting from the increasing
number of class action suits brought in state courts.26 Though
federal courts also face burdensome caseloads, they have more
resources, such as law clerks, magistrate judges, and consolidation
procedures, to help alleviate the difficulties inherent in litigating a
complex class action suit.
27
These problems are examples of some of the recurring issues in
class action litigation that led to the amendment of 28 U.S.C. §
1332, one of several CAFA provisions. Congress believed these
problems could be resolved if federal courts were the forum for the
majority of these suits.
B. An Explanation of the Focal Provisions of This Comment
This comment focuses on CAFA's new diversity requirements
as laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). As a result of the problems in
the pre-CAFA class action regime, Congress amended § 1332's
jurisdictional provisions to provide for the litigation of the majority
of class action suits in federal court. It is clear that CAFA makes it
easier for plaintiffs and defendants to bring class action suits in
federal court, but there was concern that such an exclusive
provision would potentially hinder the states' adjudication of class
action suits in which they have a strong interest.28 As stated
earlier, Congress developed three exceptions providing instances in
which a class action suit should remain in state court: the "Home
State" exception, the "Local Controversy" exception, and the
"State Action Case" exception.
29
26. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14.
27. Beisner & Miller, supra note 16, at 152.
28. 151 CONG. REc. S999, S1000 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
29. Id.
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1. The "Home State" Exception
The "Home State" exception originated as a means to address
class action suits brought in the primary defendant's home state.
30
When analyzing this exception, three sub-categories of cases
should be considered to determine whether the case will go to state
or federal court.31 First, under § 1332(d)(4)(B), if two-thirds or
more of the members of the plaintiff class and the primary
defendants are citizens of the same state in which the suit was
32filed, then the case may stay in state court. Second, under §
1332(d)(2), if more than two-thirds of the members of the plaintiff
class or one or more of the primary defendants are not citizens of
the state in which the action was filed, then the case will go to
federal court.33 Lastly, under § 1332(d)(3), if more than one-third
but less than two-thirds of the members of the plaintiff class and
the primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action
was filed, then jurisdiction is based upon the judge's discretion
after evaluating the six factors enumerated in § 1332(d)(3)(A)-
(F).
3 4
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(3) & (d)(4)(B) (2005). See also S. REP. No. 109-
14, at 36 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 35. The exception was
developed by Senator Feinstein during the 108th Congress. 151 CONG. REC.
S999, S 1000 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter).
31. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 35.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The six factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F) (2005)
include the following:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate
interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in
which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to
avoid Federal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is
substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State,
and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is
dispersed among a substantial number of States; and
20071 909
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2. The "Local Controversy" Exception
The "Local Controversy" exception 35 is another exception to
federal jurisdiction. It allows state courts to continue adjudicating
local controversies involving defendants who are out-of-state
corporations. 36 In order for federal courts to decline to exercise
jurisdiction, the parties to the suit must satisfy four criteria. First,
the plaintiff class must be primarily local (more than two-thirds
from the same state).37 Second, at least one real defendant, whose
conduct is central to the claim (significant liability) and from
whom the class seeks significant relief, must be local (hereinafter
"significant defendant"). The defendant must also be a citizen of
38the state in which the action was originally filed. Next, the
principal injuries allegedly caused by the defendant must have
occurred in the state where the suit was brought.39 Finally, no
similar class actions can have been filed against any of the
defendants in the preceding three years.4°  The "Local
Controversy" exception is generally understood to provide state
court jurisdiction for those truly local controversies that uniquely
affect a particular locality to the exclusion of all others, not to
create a jurisdictional loophole.4'
(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, 1 or more other class actions asserted the same or similar claims
on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.
35. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
36. Id. See also 151 CONG. REC. S999, S1000 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Specter).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2005). See also S. REP. No. 109-14, at
39 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa)-(cc) (2005). See also S. REP. No.
109-14, at 40 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38. The ambiguous
term in this provision makes it difficult to discern what the real differences are
between a "significant defendant" and a "primary defendant."
39. 28 U.S.C..§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) (2005). See also S. REP. No. 109-14,
at 40 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii) (2005). See also S. REP. No. 109-14, at
40 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39.
41. 151 CONG. REC. H723-01, H728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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Though the "Local Controversy" exception does not utilize the
phrase "primary defendants," it is important to consider this
exception in the analysis of "primary defendants" because when
the "Home State" exception is inapplicable, the "Local
Controversy" exception may be relevant. However, the proper
application of the "Local Controversy" exception, like the "Home
State" exception, is unclear. It fails to define the phrase
"significant defendants." The various articles addressing CAFA
have expressed confusion as to what the real difference is between
primary and significant defendants.42 The Adams v. Federal
Materials Co., Inc.43 case, set forth in Part C of this section,
illustrates the importance of distinguishing these two terms.44
3. The "State Action Case" Exception
The "State Action Case" exception is the final exception to
federal jurisdiction. This provision, like the "Home State"
exception, also utilizes the phrase "primary defendants., 45  It
requires class action suits in which states, state officials, or other
governmental entities are the primary defendants to be adjudicated
in state court.46 Once again, the Congressional Record states that
this exception is not to serve as a loophole for plaintiffs to bring
actions in state court by naming state entities as defendants when
the suit primarily targets non-governmental entities.
47
Though § 1332(d) allows a select number of class action suits
to remain in state court, those cases are the exception and not the
rule. Forum shopping was one of the primary problems with pre-
CAFA class actions. Therefore, the general purpose of CAFA's
procedural changes is to prevent both plaintiffs and defendants
from creating jurisdictional loopholes in search of a more
favorable forum.
42. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 14, at 29-30.
43. No. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005).
44. See discussion infra Part II.C.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (2005). See also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 41-
42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39-40.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (2005).
47. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.
2007]
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C. Problems with the Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction As
Enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
Upon analyzing CAFA, interpretive difficulty arises almost
immediately because of the exceptions' failure to define the phrase
"primary defendant" as used in both the "Home State" exception
and the "State Action Case" exception. CAFA also fails to define
the use of "significant defendants" in the "Local Controversy"
exception. This section analyzes the problems posed by each of
these exceptions through the use of the case Adams v. Federal
Materials Co., Inc.,48 which improperly interpreted these
provisions. It also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
between "primary defendant," as used in the "Home State"
exception and "State Action Case" exception, and "significant
defendant," as used in the "Local Controversy" exception.
1. Illustration of the Problems with the "Home State"
Exception and "State Action Case " Exception
Adams v. Federal Materials Co., Inc.4 9 was one of the first
cases to address the ambiguity of "primary defendants" as used in
the "Home State" exception. In Adams, plaintiffs filed a class
action suit in state court against Federal Materials Co., Inc.
("Federal"), an operator of a ready-mix concrete business, and
Hanson, a quarry owner that provided Federal with coarse
aggregate used to make concrete. 50 Plaintiffs alleged that the
aggregate was defective and that defendants failed to inform the
plaintiffs of this defect.
5 1
The court's analysis of the applicability of the "Home State"
exception became befuddled when Federal and Hanson, both
Kentucky citizens, brought a third party claim against Rogers
48. Adams, 2005 WL 1862378.
49. Id. For other cases that have interpreted the meaning of "primary
defendant" since this comment was written, see Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.,
No. 06-1363, 2006 WL 2348888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2006); Hangarter v. The
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. 05-04558, 2006 WL 213834 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2006); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-5644, 2005 WL 3967998 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 21, 2005).
50. Adams, 2005 WL 1862378, at *1.
51. Id.
912 [Vol. 67
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Group, an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business
in Tennessee.5 2 Plaintiffs later named Rogers, the new owner of
Hanson's quarry, as a defendant in the case.5 3 Rogers then sought
to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(2)(A) of CAFA. 54 Plaintiffs contested that the case should
remain in state court under the "Home State" exception.
55
This case presents an opportunity for determining which of the
defendants classifies as primary under this comment's proposed
direct liability definition. Federal and Hanson appear to both be
directly liable to the plaintiff class. They were both principal
actors in the creation of the defective concrete-one provided the
materials, the other created the final product.
Rogers is more difficult to find directly liable. The district
court classified him as a primary defendant because the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to name Rogers as a defendant and, thus,
subjected him to the same liability as Federal and Hanson.5 6
However, this reasoning is faulty. Rogers should not be classified
as a primary defendant for purposes of determining federal
jurisdiction simply because he is a named defendant. The
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand alleged
that although discovery had just commenced, the evidence
indicated that the majority, if not all, of the coarse aggregate was
produced while Hanson was still the owner of the quarry.5 7 If
Rogers did not produce the defective product, then he did not have
a direct relationship to the plaintiff class.
One of the characteristics of a primary defendant is liability to
the vast majority of the plaintiff class. If minimal discovery cannot
prove that Rogers was "allegedly liable" to the majority of the
plaintiff class, then there is no direct liability and Rogers cannot be
classified as a primary defendant for purposes of removing the case
to federal court. The primary defendants, Federal and Hanson, are
52. Id. at* *1-2.
53. Id. at* 1.
54. Id. (general CAFA provision providing federal jurisdiction for minimal
diversity cases).
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id. at *5.
57. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, No. 5:05-
CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1514754, at *4 n.l (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2005).
20071 913
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citizens of Kentucky and the plaintiffs' contention that more than
two-thirds of the class are citizens of Kentucky is uncontested.58
Therefore, the case should have remained in state court under the
"Home State" exception.
2. Illustration of the Problems with the "Local Controversy"
Exception
In Adams, the court did not consider the "Local Controversy"
exception. However, distinguishing between primary and
significant defendants is crucial to determining the applicability of
the "Home State" and "Local Controversy" exceptions. If the
court classified Federal, Hanson, and Rogers as primary
defendants, then the "Home State" exception would not apply but
the "Local Controversy" exception may have provided alternate
grounds for keeping the case in state court. Assuming no similar
actions had been filed against Federal and Hanson in the last three
years, then the case satisfied the other three factors of the
exception. It was uncontested that the plaintiff class was primarily
local.59 Moreover, Federal and Hanson were both local significant
defendants because their businesses and customers were both
located in Kentucky.6°  The buildings constructed with the
defective concrete were also primarily located in Kentucky.
6 1
Therefore, though the case did not remain in state court under the
"Home State" exception, it appears that it may have remained in
state court under the "Local Controversy" exception.
The Adams case emphasizes the interpretive difficulty that
arises as a result of Congress's failure to define the terms "primary
defendant" and "significant defendant." These three exceptions-
the "Home State" exception, the "Local Controversy" exception,
and the "State Action Case" exception-serve to allocate cases
between state and federal court, so it is important to distinguish
between the two kinds of defendants. Providing a means to define
and distinguish "primary defendants" from "significant
defendants" will lessen the time and expense of litigating an
58. Adams, 2005 WL 1862378, at *5.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *5.
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already complex class action suit. The definitions of these phrases
will be particularly important when the plaintiff class names
several defendants and desires to keep the class action in state
court.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ANALYSIS
In proceeding through the statutory interpretation process, this
comment analyzes "primary defendants" both from a textualist's
62
perspective and from a purposivist' S63 perspective.
64
A. Analysis of the Text in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
For most judges and interpreters, the analysis of a statute's
meaning begins with the text.65  Therefore, this comment's
interpretation of "primary defendant" as used in § 1332(d) begins
with an analysis of the text itself and then moves on to an analysis
of the surrounding text.
62. New textualists, like Justice Scalia, look only to the plain or ordinary
meaning of a word. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?,
96 MICH. L. REv. 1509, 1511 (1998). The focus of new textualists is strictly
upon the internal context of a statute; therefore, they look to the statute as a
whole, dictionaries and grammar books, canons of construction, and common
sense judgments. Id. at 1532.
63. Purposivists, on the other hand, often apply what Judge Posner calls
imaginative reconstruction, looking to how the legislator enacting the statute
would have applied the statute. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983).
Judges applying a purposivistic approach often rely on the language and
apparent purpose of a statute, its background, the legislative history (particularly
floor statements of the sponsors and committee reports), and other related
statutes. Id. at 818.
64. Both textualism and purposivism are "agency" theories of statutory
interpretation in that they operate from the traditional premise that the judge
functions as the faithful agent of the legislature in interpreting a statute. This
comment will not analyze CAFA from the perspective of "nonagency" theories
of statutory interpretation that reject this traditional premise. See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-80 (1994).
65. Frank Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994).
2007]
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1. The Text Itself
Defining a word in terms of its opposite is useful in examining
ambiguous text. "Secondary" is the antonym of "primary."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the
adjective "primary" as "first in rank or importance; functioning or
transmitted without intermediary: direct; not derived from or
dependent on something else: firsthand, independent, original.
66
This definition implies that a "primary defendant" is someone who
plays a principal role in the litigation, someone with whom the
plaintiff class is most directly related, someone who may be
classified as being most responsible for the injury caused to the
class members. Note that "primary defendant," as used in the
statute, is in its plural form.6 Thus, there can be more than one
primary defendant. If such is the case, then it becomes difficult to
determine how to evaluate which of the defendants is most
culpable. 68 The statutory text thus far reveals that the defendants
must classify as parties of primary rather than secondary
66. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1800 (Philip
Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 1986) (1961). Though judges' reliance on
dictionaries has been criticized over the years because of their limited ability to
reflect the statutory text, it is a less controversial tool when utilized in the
beginning of the interpretive process to identify the general outlines of word
meanings. Symposium, Changing Images of the State--Looking it Up:
Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1437, 1450-52
(1994).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2005) states in part:
(3) A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the
totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction under
paragraph (2) over a class action in which greater than one-third but
less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed based on consideration of...
(emphasis added).
(5) Paragraphs (2) through (4) shall not apply to any class action in
which-
(A) the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other
governmental entities against whom the district court may be
foreclosed from ordering relief... (emphasis added).
68. This issue will be addressed later in this comment.
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importance. They must also have a direct connection to the
wrongdoing, as well as to the plaintiff class.
2. The Surrounding Text--A Focus on the Differences
Between "Primary Defendants" and "Significant Defendants"
As Utilized in CAFA
Another useful method in determining the meaning of an
ambiguous term is to analyze the statutory text surrounding the
term. As illustrated in the Adams case, analyzing who classifies as
a "significant defendant," as opposed to a "primary defendant," is
essential in the application of the proper jurisdictional exception.
Presumably, the terms classifying these two defendants do not
mean the same thing or else Congress would have simply used
"primary defendant" in the "Local Controversy" exception as
well.69 The committee's reference to a "significant defendant" in §
1332(d)(4)(A)(II)(aa)-(cc) is intended to encompass those local
defendants who are the primary, rather than the peripheral, focus of
the plaintiffs' claims. 70 The defendant must be a target from whom
significant relief is sought by the entire class and whose alleged
conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the
class. 7
1
Compare the intended meaning of "significant defendant" with
the intended meaning of "primary defendant." 72 There are many
similarities between the two definitions. For example, both
definitions require the defendants to be liable to a majority of the
class.73 They also both refer to the defendants as "targets" of the
lawsuit.74  While a "significant defendant" is one from whom
significant relief is sought, a "primary defendant" is one who will
suffer the greatest loss if liability is found. If a defendant will
69. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4)(B) (2005), with id. §
1332(d)(4)(A).
70. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 40 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38.
71. Id.
72. See source cited infra note 85.
73. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 40 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38
(addressing "significant defendants"); 151 CONG. REC. H723, H732 (daily ed.
Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (addressing "primary defendants").
74. Id.
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suffer the greatest loss if liability is found, then the plaintiffs must
be seeking significant relief from that particular defendant. If that
is true, then a "primary defendant" is a "significant defendant."
On the other hand, if a defendant is one from whom significant
relief is sought, he will not necessarily suffer the greatest loss, such
that he may be deemed a "primary defendant." Though the relief
from one defendant may be significant, it may not be as significant
as some of the other defendants who will suffer a greater loss.
This analysis implies that all "primary defendants" are "significant
defendants," but not all "significant defendants" are "primary
defendants."
Distinguishing the differences between these terms is difficult.
The phrase "primary defendants" has been defined by courts and
has also been utilized in other statutory contexts. 75 "Significant
defendants," on the other hand, is undefined both judicially and
statutorily. Therefore, determination of its meaning is
76
speculative.
B. Legislative Intent
For judges utilizing a purposivist approach, the next step in the
statuto 7 interpretation process entails an evaluation of legislative
intent. While the reconstruction of congressional intent is a
75. See sources cited infra notes 92-135 and accompanying text.
76. Due to a lack of legislative history, other than that stated in the text
above, and a lack of case law and statutes applying "significant defendant," this
term is not analyzed in the same depth as "primary defendant." Despite a lack
of authority defining or applying this term, it is important to recognize that there
is a potential distinction between "significant defendants" and "primary
defendants" as used in CAFA. For cases that have recently discussed the
meaning of "significant defendant" in the context of the "Local Controversy"
exception, see Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (11th Cir.
2006); Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-2613, 2007 WL 64162, at *3-5 (E.D.
La. Jan. 8, 2007); Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., No. 06-0005, 2006 WL 468820
(W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2006); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-5644, 2005 WL
3967998, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005).
77. While there is controversy surrounding the use of legislative intent in
statutory interpretation, it is utilized in this comment as a means of further
exploring all potential definitions of "primary defendant."
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difficult, and perhaps impossible, task,78 the Congressional Record
contains several important clues as to the purposes underlying
CAFA's exceptions.
First, Congress has expressed a strong preference that class
actions be heard in federal court.7 9 Therefore, § 1332(d) should be
read broadly with a preference for class actions to be brought in
federal court; conversely, the exceptions to federal jurisdiction in §
1332(d) should be read narrowly.80 The exceptions are exceptions,
not loopholes for avoiding federal jurisdiction. 8 1  As a result,
plaintiffs should be prohibited from naming "token defendants"
merely to keep cases in state court.82 Second, the new removal
standards are meant to prevent plaintiffs' lawyers from
manipulating their cases to keep them in state court.83 Finally,
Congress intended for the plaintiffs, not the defendant, to bear the
burden of demonstrating that a case should be remanded to state
court.84  Thus, they must demonstrate which defendants are
primary to the class action.
The sponsors' statement gives some indication of how
Congress intended to define "primary defendant." Their intent was
for the term primary defendants:
[T]o reach those defendants who are the real targets of the
lawsuit, i.e. the defendants who would be expected to incur
most of the loss if liability is found. Thus, the term
"primary defendant" should include any person who has
substantial exposure to significant portions of the proposed
class in the action, particularly any defendant that is
78. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 869-72,
875-78 (1929).
79. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H730 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner).
80. Id.
81. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte).
82. Blumstein, supra note 4, at 19.
83. Rollo & Crowson, supra note 2, at 13.
84. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43-44 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
41. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text for a statement of
why courts may choose not to use the Senate Judiciary Committee Report as an
interpretive aid.
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allegedly liable to the vast majority of the members of the
proposed classes, as opposed to simply a few individual
class members.
85
Congress recognized that courts may need to engage in fact-
finding, as well as discovery, in order to determine who constitutes
a primary defendant. 86 However, Congress emphasized that this
discovery should be limited to information readily available and
not burdensome to acquire. 87  The sponsors' use of "allegedly
liable" in their definition of "primary defendants," as well as their
allowance of only minimal discovery, implies that the
classification of a defendant as primary will involve some
speculation. Congress recognized the difficulty in determining
which defendants will suffer the largest proportions of liability at
the outset of the litigation. Therefore, as long as there is some
evidence to classify defendants as primary, they may be named as
such for purposes of determining state or federal jurisdiction under
§ 1332(d).8
The legislative history of CAFA also reveals that a state only
has jurisdiction under the "Home State" exception if almost all of
the members of the plaintiff class are from the same state as the
primary defendants.89  As used in this provision, a primary
defendant must have been an active participant in the wrongdoing
and the outcome of the defendant's conduct must have affected all
of the plaintiff class rather than a select few.
90
In sum, the legislative history reveals that Congress intended
for the primary defendants to be those who: (1) are likely to incur
most of the loss when liability is found; (2) actually participated in
the wrongdoing; and (3) are liable to the whole class as opposed to
just a few. "As a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors,
this explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in
85. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte) (emphasis added).
86. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 44 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42.
87. Id.
88. Id. (stating that "[l]ess burdensome means (e.g., factual stipulations)
should be used in creating a record upon which jurisdictional determinations can
be made").
89. H.R. REP. No. 107-370, at 30 (2002).
90. Id.
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interpreting the statute." 9 1 Though some judges, such as Justice
Scalia, would afford no weight to this statement, other judges
would use it as an element in their analysis. For purposes of
completeness, Congress's definition of "primary defendant" will
be utilized as one factor in this comment's formulation of the
appropriate definition of "primary defendant."
C. Defining "Primary Defendant" by Drawing Analogies to Its
Use in Related Statutes and Other Areas of the Law
This section analyzes the use of "primary defendant" as it is
applied in the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act
("MMTJA"), as well as its use in tort law. It also analyzes judicial
interpretations of the term. The use of "primary defendant" in
CAFA may be analogized to the use and interpretation of the term
in these three areas of the law.
1. The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act's Use of
"Primary Defendant"
The MMTJA 92 may be analogized to CAFA because, like
CAFA, it contains a minimal diversity jurisdiction provision
91. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976).
It is significant to note that the emphasis placed on legislative intent was less
controversial at the time of this case than it is today. The influence of Justice
Scalia's new textualist approach and concerns about the misuse of legislative
intent have led to a decline in the use of legislative intent as an interpretive
device. Lori L. Outzs, A Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in
Statutory Interpretation, 28 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 297, 297 (1995). It is
purposivists who would place more emphasis on the sponsors' statement.
Posner, supra note 63, at 818.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2005) states:
(a) In general.-The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties
that arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons
have died in the accident at a discrete location, if-
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident
took place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that
defendant is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or
2007]
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utilizing the term "primary defendant." This section draws an
analogy between CAFA and the MMTJA by analyzing the
MMTJA and its application of the minimal diversity provision.
93
The MMTJA, enacted in 2002, allows minimal diversity
jurisdiction when a single accident causes the deaths of at least
seventy-five people. 94 The similarities between the jurisdictional
provisions in the MMTJA and CAFA are evidenced by the context
in which they were created. Both were intended to move a class of
cases from state to federal court, as indicated by the minimal
diversity provisions in both.95  However, they both include
exceptions to federal jurisdiction that were integrated into the
statutes as compromise clauses.
96
The legislative history of both statutes provides similar
interpretations of "primary defendants." The House Report on the
MMTJA describes a "primary defendant" as "one who is expected
to suffer the greatest loss if found liable." 97  This definition is
almost identical to the one provided by Congress in CAFA's
sponsors' statement.98 Not only are the definitions in the statutes
similar, but the legislative history of both statutes also indicates
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States.
(b) Limitation ofjurisdiction of district courts.-The district court shall
abstain from hearing any civil action described in subsection (a) in
which-
(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State
of which the primary defendants are also citizens; and
(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that
State.
93. Rollo & Crowson, supra note 2, at 15.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2005).
95. Id. § 1369(a); id, § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C).
96. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.R.I. 2004). It is
significant to note that the author of the MMTJA, Representative Sensenbrenner,
was also a sponsor of CAFA. See id. at 52. See also 51 CONG. REC. H723,
H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
Sensenbrenner's participation in the drafting of both these clauses indicates that
a similar interpretation of "primary defendants" may be applied to both
provisions.
97. Laura Offenbacher, The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act:
Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REv. LrrlG. 177, 201 (2004).
98. See source cited supra note 85.
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that a "primary defendant" must be someone who is liable to every
member of the class. 99 The similarities between CAFA's and the
MMTJA's purpose and legislative history support the
appropriateness of analogizing the use of "primary defendant" in
the MMTJA to the use of "primary defendant" in CAFA.
Passa v. Derderian° ° was the first case to apply the term
"primary defendant" in the context of the MMTJA. In this case,
more than seventy-five people were killed as a result of a fire that
broke out in a crowded nightclub. 10 1 The fire allegedly started
when band members, along with their manager, ignited
pyrotechnic devices that lit the ceiling's foam insulation on fire.
0 2
The named defendants included the members of the band, the
management company, the record label, the nightclub owners, a
corporation owned by the nightclub owners, a real estate company,
insulation manufacturers, event sponsors, and representatives of
government agencies.'0 3 The dispute was over § 1369(b), which
provides that a district court shall exercise jurisdiction if the
minimal diversity requirements are satisfied, at least seventy-five
people died, and a series of other factors are fulfilled.1
0 4
The opinion addressed three possible definitions of "primary
defendants": (1) those who are the deepest pockets; (2) those who
are most culpable of the wrongdoing; and (3) those who are facing
direct liability.10 5 The court concluded that defining the "primary
defendants" as those who are directly liable to the plaintiff class
provided the most workable definition under the statute.' °6  it
stated "that all defendants sued directly in a cause of action
maintain a dominant relationship to the subject matter of the
controversy, while those parties sued under theories of vicarious
liability, or joined for purposes of indemnification or contribution,
maintain an indirect or 'secondary' relationship to the
99. Offenbacher, supra note 97, at 202.
100. 308 F. Supp. 2d 43.
101. Id. at 46.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id. at 50-51. See also source cited supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62.
106. Id. at 63.
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litigation."' i0 7 It reasoned that this definition was the most practical
because it only requires a review of the complaint to determine
which defendants are sued directly, as opposed to requiring the
court to make a pre-trial determination of culpability.'0 8
The utility of Passa's direct liability definition becomes
evident after a complete analysis of the use of "primary
defendants" in other areas of the law and after the consideration of
a series of other possible definitions.
2. An Analysis of the Use of "Primary Defendants " in Other
Areas of the Law
Other areas of the law that utilize the term "primary
defendants" are instructive in narrowing the scope of defendants
who fall into this category. "Primary defendant" has many
different meanings depending on the context of its use. This
section looks to how courts have defined the term "primary
defendants" and analyzes how tort law has utilized similar
terminology.
a. Judicial Interpretations of "Primary Defendants"
Courts have defined the phrase "primary defendants" in
determining liability, as well as a defendant's connection to the
plaintiff. The following section analyzes these judicial definitions
as used in cases involving the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), securities fraud, and tobacco anti-
trust.
In RICO claims, courts have defined "primary defendants" as
those who participate in the racketeering activity; whereas, the
secondary defendants are judicially defined as the aiders and
abettors of that activity.' 09 For example, in Rolo v. City Investing
Co. Liquidating Trust,"0 plaintiffs claimed they were deceived by
a fraudulent marketing scheme that induced them to purchase
107. Id. at 62.
108. Id. at 63.
109. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 650 (3d Cir.
1998).
110. Id.
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residential lots and homes at inflated prices."' Claims against
thirty-five defendants were brought under RICO, the Land Sales
Act, federal securities laws, and common law fraud." 2 Plaintiffs'
complaint classified the defendants according to the nature of their
participation in the alleged fraudulent acts by dividing them into
six different categories." 3 They were then further divided into
categories of primary and secondary defendants." 14 The primary
defendants were those who allegedly participated in the operation
and management of affairs through racketeering activity. 5 The
secondary defendants were those who allegedly aided and abetted
the racketeering activity by assisting the primary defendants in
defrauding the plaintiffs."l
6
The use of "primary defendants" in RICO claims distinguishes
primary and secondary defendants as, respectively, those who were
the instigators and active participants in the operation of the
wrongful activity and those who participated in a derivative
way. 1 7 This classification of "primary defendants" is consistent
with the congressional definition, which provides that primary
defendants are not merely assistants. If a subset of the defendants
aided and abetted in the conspiracy, then it is unlikely that their
activity caused a direct effect upon the majority of the plaintiff
class. Under Congress's definition, the defendant's liability must
affect the vast majority of the plaintiffs rather than a select few.
Passa addressed the use of "primary defendants" in securities
fraud actions. The primary parties in a securities fraud action are
those who improperly purchase and sell securities from secondary
defendants, parties who have only a "legally cognizable
relationship to the plaintiff."' 18 Once again, as in RICO claims, the
111. Id. at647.
112. Id.
113. Id. at648.
114. Id. at650.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 650, 656.
117. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-86 (1993) (holding that
one must participate in operation or management of enterprise to be liable under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
118. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.R.I. 2004) (citing
Marrero v. Banco di Roma, 487 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. La. 1980) (quoting
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975))).
2007] COMMENTS 925
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
distinction between primary and secondary defendants in the
context of securities fraud actions is based upon the identification
of the active participants in the wrongdoing. A defendant who is
liable to the plaintiff merely through his relationship to one of the
primary defendants in the litigation does not necessarily classify as
primary. There must be a direct connection to the plaintiff class
that creates liability to the majority of the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court's use of the term "primary defendants" in
United States v. American Tobacco Co."19 represents another
valuable resource for formulating a definition of "primary
defendants." In this case, the Supreme Court utilized the term
"primary defendants" in a suit brought against numerous
defendants in the tobacco industry for violations of the anti-trust
act.12° Twenty-nine of the defendants were individuals, sixty-five
were American corporations, and two were foreign corporations.
12 1
The Court classified the defendants as either primary or
subsidiary. 122  American Tobacco Co., one of the sixty-five
American corporations, was deemed a primary defendant because
of its "dominant relation to the subject matter of the
controversy."'' 23  Five of the other sixty-five corporations were
classified as subsidiary defendants because their relation to the
controversy was accessory. 124  This case re-emphasizes that a
primary defendant must be someone who is an active participant in
the wron2doing-a principal actor rather than merely an
accessory.
b. Use of "Primary Defendant'" in Tort Law
Tort law is another area of law that utilizes the term "primary
defendant" in conjunction with "secondary defendant." The use of
119. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
120. Id. at 108.
121. Id. at 142-43.
122. Id. at 143.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Cf 151 CONG. REc. H723, H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte) (arguing that the term "primary defendant" should include those
allegedly liable to a large majority of members of a class in a class action suit).
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these terms often arises in the context of indemnification,
contribution, and vicarious liability. 126 Third parties are brought
into an action for contribution and indemnification purposes as a
result of a named defendant's belief that they are partially or
entirely responsible for the injury to the plaintiffs. 127 These third
party defendants are probably not primary defendants under CAFA
because they may or may not have a direct relationship to the
plaintiffs. Recall the Passa case, which stated that "all defendants
sued directly in a cause of action maintain a dominant relationship
to the subject matter of the controversy, while those parties sued
under theories of vicarious liability, or joined for purposes of
indemnification or contribution, maintain an indirect or
'secondary' relationship to the litigation."' 2 8
The problem with stating that all parties joined for purposes of
contribution or indemnification are not primary defendants is that
the plaintiffs may have simply omitted a party who is in fact
primary to the action. Plaintiffs' ability to omit a party creates a
potential loophole because the plaintiff class may rely on the
named defendants to join these omitted parties in order to keep the
action in state court. It then becomes difficult to determine if the
omitted party was joined simply as a means for the other primary
defendants to recover contribution or indemnification or if the third
party defendant actually has a relationship with the plaintiffs.
Under a literal interpretation, if a party is joined for purposes of
contribution or indemnification, then he probably cannot be
classified as a "primary defendant" for purposes of determining
jurisdiction.
Indemnification, as opposed to contribution, utilizes two
important concepts in determining apportionment of liability that
may be analogized to the use of primary and secondary defendants
in CAFA. Those concepts are the "active-passive distinction" and
the "primary-secondary dichotomy."'129  The "active-passive
distinction" recognizes that some defendants have participated in
126. Marshall S. Shapo, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 283-87 (2d ed. 2003).
127. Id. at 276.
128. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.R.I. 2004). See also
source cited supra note 107.
129. Shapo, supra note 126, at 284.
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causing injury to the plaintiffs in a more direct and controlling
manner. 130 If a defendant falls under the active tortfeasor category,
then he is unlikely to recover indemnity from the passive tortfeasor
because he has engaged in the most direct acts toward the
plaintiffs.
131
The "primary-secondary dichotomy" also distinguishes
between primary and secondary tortfeasors. 32  A secondary
tortfeasor's liability arises only by operation of law, such as with
vicarious liability in the context of respondeat superior. 133 It is the
employee who is in fact liable; therefore, the employer should be
able to seek reimbursement from the employee. 134 The legislative
history of CAFA provides that "an executive of a corporate
defendant who, in the interest of completeness is named as a co-
defendant in a class action against his employer, normally should
not be deemed as a primary defendant."' 135 Therefore, it does not
appear that CAFA recognizes as primary those defendants who are
named simply for their relationship to the other principal
defendants in the action.
The "active-passive distinction" and "primary-secondary
dichotomy" further illustrate the idea that a primary defendant
connotes someone who has a direct relationship with and direct
liability to the plaintiffs. It is ultimately those "active" and
"primary" tortfeasors who will suffer the greatest liability since
they will be unable to recover indemnification from the "passive"
and "secondary" tortfeasors.
3. Summary of What Other Areas of the Law Contribute to the
Definition of "Primary Defendants " in CAFA
The use of "primary defendants" in other areas of the law
reveals a theme, which emerges from each category. A primary
defendant must be a principal, rather than a secondary or
subsidiary actor. He must be someone with a strong, direct
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 285.
134. Id.
135. H.R. REP. No. 107-370, at 30 (2002).
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relationship with all members of the plaintiff class. He must be an
active participant in the wrongdoing. This theme, which weaves
throughout every area of the law utilizing the phrase "primary
defendant," should carry through to the jurisdictional provisions of
CAFA.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DEFINITIONS
Various proposals have been suggested for the most
appropriate definition of "primary defendant." The following
section analyzes several of these proposals and distinguishes the
advantages and disadvantages of each definition.
A. Deep Pockets
A defendant with the deepest pockets is one way to define
"primary defendant." A defendant with the deepest pockets is the
one most capable of paying damages to an injured plaintiff;
therefore, he is the one the plaintiff is most likely to sue.
136
However, such a definition is inconsistent with the sponsors'
interpretation of "primary defendant."' 137 The deepest pockets will
not necessarily include those defendants who will suffer most of
the loss when liability is found. There is no direct correlation
between a defendant's actual liability and his ability to pay.
Therefore, defining "primary defendants" as those with the deepest
pockets is impractical since Congress's intent in enacting this
legislation was to discourage the naming of defendants who are not
actual targets of the lawsuit.
The congressional definition of "primary defendants" requires
the defendant to be the one who is the "real 'target' of the
lawsuit."' 38 The "target" defendant is one whom the plaintiff has
selected for special attention. 139 This defendant may have been
136. See 151 CONG. REC. H723, H734 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Cannon).
137. See source cited supra note 85 (quoting the sponsors' definition of
"primary defendant").
138. S. REP. No. 109-14, at43 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,41.
139. Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, Effectively Representing the "Deep
Pocket" or Target Defendant, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 27, 1996, available at
12-27-96 WLN 13768.
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targeted for several reasons: his perceived culpability, his negative
public perception, or his "deep pocket."' 140 It is unclear to which
"target" CAFA refers. It appears that the defendant is to be
targeted as result of his culpability. This inference is implicit in
Congress's specification that the primary defendant be one who is
allegedly liable to a majority of the plaintiff class. Under this
analysis, it is irrelevant that the "deep pocket" has the ability to
pay if he is not in fact a "target" for purposes of culpability.
Defining "primary defendants" as "deep pockets" is also a poor
public policy. It violates the premise of the tort system, which
states, "liability should be based on a factual determination that the
defendant failed to meet certain standards."' 141 If a "primary
defendant" is defined as such because he is a "deep pocket," then
future harm will not be deterred because the emphasis is placed on
wealth, rather than on culpability. 1
42
Though defining "primary defendants" as "deep pockets" may
seem practical, the basis for the classification should be on liability
rather than on an ability to compensate the plaintiff. If the "deep
pocket" turns out to be the primary defendant, then at least the
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff class is based
on liability rather than on wealth.
B. Primary v. Secondary Liability and Direct v. Vicarious
Liability
Primary or direct liability is another possible means of defining
"primary defendant." Black's Law Dictionary defines "primary
liability" as "liability for which one is directly responsible, as
opposed to secondary liability."' 43 "Secondary liability," in turn, is
defined as "liability that does not arise unless the primarily liable
party fails to honor its obligation."' 144
140. Id.
141. Robert MacCoun, Is There a "Deep-Pocket" Bias in the Tort System?
The Concern Over Biases Against Deep Pocket Defendants, The Institute for
Civil Justice, Oct. 1993, available at IP-130-ICJ.
142. Id.
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
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A primarily liable defendant is one who is directly liable. 14 5
Therefore, it is appropriate to define "primary defendant" as one
who is directly liable to the plaintiff class. 146 These two terms go
hand in hand with one another. The use of direct liability to define
primary defendants is consistent with congressional intent as well
as the ordinary meaning of the words. The word "primary"
necessarily implies someone who is a principal rather than
peripheral actor in the litigation. A primary defendant cannot be
secondarily or vicariously liable because these terms are contrary
to the plain meaning of the word "primary."
One potential problem with the definition of "direct liability" is
determining how to classify a defendant as directly liable before
the trial begins. The simple solution, as discussed earlier, is to
conduct minimal discovery. 47 Though such a procedure may not
produce concrete evidence of a defendant's culpability, there need
only be enough to prove on the face of the complaint that the
defendant is "allegedly liable."'
148
Defining the "primary defendants" as those who are "directly
liable" also poses a potential loophole for plaintiffs to defeat
federal jurisdiction. Though defendants who join the action for
purposes of contribution and indemnification may ultimately be the
primarily liable parties, classifying defendants as primary is only
important at the outset of the litigation. Until a full-fledged trial
takes places, it is impossible to determine who the primary
defendants are. Therefore, plaintiffs have the opportunity to
simply refrain from naming an out-of-state defendant they do not
"believe" is directly liable in order to defeat federal jurisdiction.
They may instead rely on the named, in-state, primary defendants
to bring these out-of-state defendants into the action as third
parties.
In Adams, 49 let us assume that all three defendants were
primary. The plaintiff class did not initially name Rogers as a
primary defendant, though he may in fact have been subject to the
145. Id.
146. See Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 63 (D.R.I. 2004).
147. See sources cited supra notes 85-88.
148. Id.; see discussion supra Part II.C.1.
149. See sources cited supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
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same amount of liability as Federal and Hanson. By relying on the
named primary defendants to bring Rogers into the action as a
third party, the plaintiffs could have kept the case in state court.
Despite this potential loophole, defining the "primary
defendants" as those who are directly liable is a greater protection
against forum shopping than pre-CAFA litigation procedures.
Under CAFA, plaintiffs can no longer name local defendants
unless they are expected to suffer most of the loss if liability is
found and unless they are expected to be liable to a majority of the
plaintiff class.
V. CONCLUSION
Defining the "primary defendants" as those who are directly
liable is sound public policy and is consistent with both the plain
meaning of the words and with the legislative intent. It fosters a
good public policy because it holds accountable those defendants
who are primarily responsible for the plaintiffs injuries. In doing
so, it satisfies the goal of tort law to deter future misconduct.
"Direct liability" is consistent with the plain meaning of the words
because it necessarily places those who are primarily, as opposed
to secondarily, liable in the category of "primary defendants."
Finally, under the sponsors' definition, if a defendant is directly
liable, then he will be among those who are the real targets of the
lawsuit, those who will be liable to the majority of the plaintiff
class, and those who will suffer most of the loss if liability is
found.
Few cases have applied such a definition in the context of
CAFA. Even so, there are many other areas of the law that have
made the distinction between the words "primary" and
"secondary." As illustrated throughout this comment, direct
liability is consistent with these distinctions.
Defining "primary defendants" as those who are directly liable
to the plaintiff class satisfies Congress's intent to keep class
actions in federal court. It limits who the plaintiffs may name as
primary defendants to the suit and makes it more difficult for them
to name "token defendants" as a means to keep the action in state
court. Because Congress intends for the plaintiffs to carry the
burden of proving who classifies as a primary defendant, imposing
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a direct liability requirement on the primary defendants will make
it more difficult for them to allege the liability of non-target
defendants.
Though CAFA seeks to repair many of the inequities in class
action procedures, there are many ambiguities in the new law.
Defining "primary defendants" as those who are directly liable
enables judges and attorneys to more efficiently and effectively
litigate a class action suit in a manner that is fair to both plaintiffs
and defendants.
Amanda Coney*
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